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Introduction 
Daniel G. Zirker 
The "Third Wave of Democracy" has had a decidedly mixed impact on the 
world's military establishments. An increasing appearance of "tribal behav­
ior" and social isolation of military institutions in a post-conscription era, 
wars of attrition fought conservatively by volunteer forces against ethnic 
armies, religious tradition versus various versions of modernity, these pat­
terns are rapidly becoming the hallmarks of our age. The end of the Cold 
War, and of ideology as a driving force of conflict has had profound impacts 
upon our understanding of socio-political development in virtually all parts 
of the world. In an important sense, identities-ethnic, religious, linguistic 
and even historic-have replaced the dichotomous ideological divide that 
characterized the Cold War. Social science axioms of that now almost-for­
gotten period have collapsed, along with the major "East Bloc" political 
systems, while pre-WWI obsessions with conceptualizations of culture, iden­
tity, religion and ethnicity have increasingly come to dominate political be­
havior. 
These, in turn, are extraordinarily complex and slippery concepts I and are 
all part of a new period of nationalism and national secession 2 that has 
overtaken international politics. "Ethno-politics," with its dynamics and 
"rules," have increasingly dominated the politics of democratizing nations. 
National identities are challenged, secession has become the norm, and most 
governmental institutions now routinely struggle for fiscal and political 
autonomy as part of their survival strategies in an increasingly privatized 
world. 
Military establishments are inevitably drawn into this struggle for institu­
tional autonomy and, in culturally plural societies, into ethno-politics. The 
resultant growing insularity and advanced competencies naturally combine 
with their uniformly central mission to protect and preserve the nation, even 
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when that nation, because of profound ethnic pluralism, is difficult to iden­
tify as a single entity. The military must, in a sense, become the nation in 
order to preserve it, even if it does not, or cannot, reflect it accurately from a 
demographic perspective. As Alfred de Vigny observed in his nineteenth­
century classic Servitude et grandeur militaires, "An army is a nation within 
a nation."3 Morris Janowitz made the same point in more technical terms: 
"The military profession is more than an occupation; it is a complete style of 
life. The officer is a member of a community whose claims over his daily 
existence extend well beyond his official duties. "4 Those claims begin and 
end with the preservation of the nation . . in one form or another. 
Culture and its frozen counterpart, ethnicity, are profoundly enigmatic: 
They are at one and the same time difficult to define precisely in most cases, 
and yet all too static to those who must struggle against them in others. In 
attempting to understand the complex nexus of explanatory variables in gen­
eral ethno-political terms, many observers have argued that ethnicity is either 
a primordial sentiment, a fundamental and irreducible cause of behavior, or, 
conversely, that it is yet another, albeit very effective, instn1ment to be ma­
nipulated in the interests of power. Conceptually,primordialism and instru­
mentalism represent mutually exclusive perspectives, or approaches, al­
though in application they are typically indistinguishable and virtually al­
ways combined to some extent. That ethnicity is a significant-indeed, in­
creasingly significant-explanatory variable in world politics is, at any rate, 
beyond dispute. 
Decades ago Anthony D. Smith argued that the world was being engulfed 
by a growing emphasis upon ethnicity, that the ideological divide was fading, 
and that "nationalism . .. endows [this] ethnic revival with a scope and 
intensity which have no parallel in previous ages." 5 Developing countries 
have manifested particularly intense forms of ethnically based politics. The 
late Clifford Geertz, one of the best known "primordialists," observed that "a 
primordially based 'corporate feeling of oneness' remains for many ... the 
meaning of the term 'self' in 'self-rule' .. . [and] is not easily ... insulated 
from the web of primordial attachments."6 
It appears to be increasingly relevant and useful to apply our growing 
understanding of the dynamics of ethnic politics, their tendency to relate 
back to close (perhaps primordial) personal attachments, to at least one insti­
tution-one of the most enigmatic-that exists within most democratizing 
countries: the military. Military institutions, particularly in new or newly 
revitalized democracies after the end of the Cold War, have just begun in 
some cases to evince their own, autonomous ethnic, or quasi-ethnic, iden­
tities. These involve a distinctive and separate ethos, often a separate or 
distinctive (frequently a colonial) language, and a separate technical termi­
nology; a distinctive, ifrevisionist, "social" history, a separate mythology, a 
distinctive interpretation of nationalism, clear ( and, for officers, often ascrip-
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tive, that is, based on parental lineage, relatively unchangeable, or even al­
most compulsory) membership boundaries, and so on. We might even argue 
that this kind of autonomous institutional development will be necessary in 
the future to compete effectively for political power and resources in a new 
world of privatized budgets, declining "orthodox military missions"7 and 
ethno-politics. 
The following chapters explore military establishments as competitive 
institutions in seven democratizing countries. Some of these have, of neces­
sity, begun to model themselves, either consciously or unconsciously, as 
"quasi-ethnic" entities, in some senses "nations within nations," in order to 
establish institutional autonomy and competitiveness, secure budgets, 
achieve and retain political power, or, in at least one case, to serve as a 
vanguard nationalizing example. We have chosen to use the thoughts of 
several classic writers of the 1950s and 1960s on ethnicity ( e.g., Clifford 
Geertz, Paul Brass and Cynthia Enloe) and on the military and politics (e.g., 
Ruth First, Cynthia Enloe, Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz) to draw 
some of our conclusions regarding military behavior in this largely uncharted 
area. Understanding the ethnic tendencies of military institutions in deeply 
divided, multi-ethnic societies may well shed light on future patterns of civil­
military relations in democratizing countries. 
Ethnicity 
Why begin to examine military institutions in the context of ethnic behavior? 
The central thesis of this study is that the fundamental behavior patterns 
associated with ethnicity in the post-Cold War era may well relate directly to 
the problems-and promise-of military establishments in their inevitable 
competition for power and resources in new, and newly revitalized, democra­
cies. The dynamics and "rules" of ethno-politics increasingly predominate in 
multi-ethnic democratizing countries in the post-Cold War era. Military insti­
tutional identity, reinforced by technical and technological competency, 
along with the narrow code of military discipline, and with uniforms and 
guns, easily becomes pervasive and fixed. Legitimacy, often based on tradi­
tion, is obviously enhanced when traditions have quickly and efficiently been 
fit to purpose, "invented" 8 as it were. 
By ethnicity we mean a sense of shared common descent and/or history, 9 
largely a perception. While ethnicity, then, may seem less than concrete in 
this interpretation, it is important to reiterate that ethnic identity, indeed, all 
identity, is first and foremost a perception, and as Professor Paul Brass has 
observed, it invariably involves a claim to status. 10 Another observer has 
stressed that identity has been a "fundamental source of meaning and recog­
nition throughout human history .... a founding structure of social differen-
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tiation, and social recognition, as well as of discrimination, in many contem­
porary societies, from the United States to Sub-Saharan Africa." 11 
There is one relevant aspect to identity that must be added to an llllder­
standing of ethnicity in the context of this study, and that is territory. Linda 
Bishai noted in this regard that while "the bolllldaries of identity can be 
constituted through language, religion, race, and culture, the modem state has 
confirmed territory as the key bolllldary." 12 It was the state, then, that came 
to define the security perspective, the borders, of national, and all-too-often 
ethnic, identity. This emphasis upon territory guaranteed, and continues to 
guarantee, the role of the state as a gatekeeper-or even progenitor13-of the 
ethnic identity or identities of the "nation," broadly defined. 14 The "ortho­
dox" role of the military, protecting the nationals within their borders from 
invasion by a foreign colllltry, is easily confused with another, very different 
"national" mission, irredentism, invading neighboring territory containing 
one's own nationals (ostensibly to "re-llllite" them), as Hitler and the Wehr­
macht graphically demonstrated at the outbreak of WWII. Moreover, nation­
al military establishments, as the monopolies within their societies over the 
legitimate use of force, are implicitly involved in these elements of state 
politics. 
The primordial nature of ethnicity as a causal variable is at the heart of 
these observations. Primordialism is the condition in which ethnic identity is 
a taken as a necessary and sufficient causal variable in social and political 
interactions, a complete cause.15 Moreover it can be, and often is, 16 a corro­
sive and destructive force as regards civil society: "It .. . gives to the prob­
lem variously called tribalism, parochialism, commllllalism, and so on, a 
more ominous and deeply threatening quality than most of the other, also 
very serious and intractable problems the new states face." 17 Primordialists 
argue that ethnic identity simply is, that its practical and pernicious ramifica­
tions are basic to the human psyche, as pernicious and destructive as they 
may be. 
While a primordial interpretation of ethnic attachments may predict be­
havior accurately, it should, in our view, be qualified by two other llllder­
standings of the causal, and therefore political, nature of ethnicity. As per the 
Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, when one observes ethnic identity from 
situational and instmmental perspectives, it is difficult, perhaps even impos­
sible, to regard it as the fundamental cause of behavior. A situational ethnic 
identity is perhaps best explained in the highly multi-ethnic environment of 
Africa. A person living in an African colllltry is, at one and the same time, 
the member of a family, a clan, a dialect-speaking group, a specific religious 
group, a broader religious grouping, a larger language group, a citizen of a 
colllltry, a person from a region of Africa (e.g., British West Africa), a 
specific "racial" and ethnic type (Ibo, for example, as opposed to Hausa­
Fulani), a person from Nigeria, from Africa (e.g., when in Europe), a 
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"black," and so on. Each of these possible identities can be very strong, 
depending of course on the context. The "primordial" nature of each of these 
ties simply evaporates in an unfavorable situational context. Ethnic identity 
is simply not primordial in this example, except, perhaps, in very limited 
contexts. 
The instrumentalist perspective is also fraught with inconsistencies. From 
an instrumentalist perspective, "ethnicity is a plastic, variegated, and origi­
nally ascriptive trait that, in certain historical and socioeconomic circum­
stances, is readily politicized." Natural ethnic attachments, seen in this light, 
"generate many political entrepreneurs with a conscious and realistic interest 
in mobilizing ethnicity ... into political leverage for the purpose of altering 
or reinforcing such systems of structured inequality between and among 
ethnic categories."1 8 Put simply, there is profit to be made when people make 
use of this natural weakness for ethnic attachments. The instrumental inter­
pretations leave one key, unanswered question, however: Why, if ethnic 
identity is so malleable and easily manipulated, is it sufficiently compelling 
repeatedly to support selfish and blatantly instrumental purposes? 
It is clear that ethnic identity "causes" political and social behavior, which 
in turn yields political outcomes. Furthermore, virtually all observers agree 
that ethnic identity is, to a large-but not exclusive-extent, ascriptive in 
nature. 19 It has deeply psychological elements, a tendency toward primor­
dialism, and yet, in specific contexts can be seen to be primarily situational, 
and/or readily subject to instrumental manipulation. As American political 
scientist and communications theorist Harold Lasswell once wrote, politics is 
"who gets what, when and how." Ethnicity is easily politicized, and an ideal 
vehicle to determine who gets what, when and how. 
The Military as a Potential Quasi-Ethnic Group 
It is important to reemphasize that culture and ethnicity are extraordinarily 
slippery concepts20 and are all too easily reified. In examining what we have 
chosen to call quasi-ethnicfty for purposes of understanding the separate and 
frequently antagonistic worldviews of military establishments in new and 
newly revitalized democracies, qualified and flexible defmitions would seem 
to be most appropriate. By quasi-ethnicity, we mean to say behavior that 
mirrors or replicates in some important ways a sense �f shared common 
descent and/or history. Perceptions are extraordinarily important in this re­
gard. Examples abound of groups of shared biological and historical descent 
who nonetheless regard themselves as alien and apart. Major ethno-religious 
groups in Bosnia would fit this category. On the other hand, there are cases 
of dozens of groups that evince very different cultural and historical back­
grounds but, for recent historical or linguistic reasons, regard themselves as 
part of a single ethnic grouping. Tanzania would be a good example of this. 
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A sense of " otherness," so much a part of the hmnan psyche, goes to the heart 
of forging the sense of "sameness" in ethnic and, I propose, quasi-ethnic 
identity. An ethnic group, it seems, almost has to feel embattled to forge its 
identity. 2 1  
Quasi-ethnicity, as we suggest the use of the term, represents a common 
identity that might be located on a relational continuum somewhere between 
culture, broadly construed, and fixed ethnicity. Brass argues that there are 
"three ways of defining ethnic groups-in terms of objective attributes, with 
reference to subjective feelings, and in relation to behavior."22 A cursory 
view of military establishments in new democracies would point to some 
extent to the possible presence of all of these, at least in some cases. A sense 
of a shared and necessary worldview, common institutional and national 
cultures, a common enemy or enemies, a sanctified group mission, and even 
a special language along with a jargon verging on a patois, are all part of 
this. 2..1 Strict controls over entry and departure from group membership, the 
ascriptive element, reinforce the sense of separate identity, as do a sometimes 
revisionist or even invented institutional history, in some cases a common 
struggle, myths and preferred ideology or mindset. All of these elements are 
available to a military establishment. 
In the post-Cold War setting, developing countries have tended to re­
spond to ethnic attachments with ethno-political competition, even among 
national institutions, as a central political leitmotif. Geertz noted in the 1 960s 
that in developing countries "primordial attachments tend, as Nehru ob­
served, to be repeatedly, in some cases almost continually, proposed and 
widely acclaimed as preferred bases for the demarcation of autonomous po­
litical units."24 It is the invention, or creation, of separate identities of mili­
tary institutions that is the nub of the argument in this volume. Military 
establishments, partie'Ularly in newly democratizing, multi-ethnic systems, 
increasingly compete for power and resources via specific strategies, some­
times conscious, sometimes apparently unconscious, reverting to an almost 
atavistic form of tribalism, establishing quasi-ethnic membership bases, and 
using that unity, institutional autonomy and renewed sense of purpose to 
compete effectively, calling on their discipline, technical competency and 
guns, for institutional power and resources. 
Military institutions already manifest many of the characteristics of ethnic 
groups, although these factors are occasionally modified through "profes­
sionalism" in developed countries, hence the suggested designation of "qua­
si-ethnicity." The frankly ascriptive elements in military membership, in­
cluding the common insistence in less developed countries upon family, clan 
and ethnic group background, along with seniority in promotion and assign­
ment in the all-important officer corps, further reinforce this, while potential­
ly alienating other status groups in civilian society. 25 In most new and newly 
revitalized democracies, the general characteristics of the military organiza-
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tion stands out in stark contrast to civilian society. 26 This may be true in 
developed societies as well. As Janowitz noted in his study of the United 
States, "The military community is a relatively closed community where 
professional and residential life has been completely intermingled. " 27 This 
separateness, even isolation, of military personnel, and particularly the mili­
tary officers, can become an instrument of force modernization, but it comes 
at a cost . 
Military establishments in new and revitalized democracies also tend to 
evince a monopoly of technical expertise in their countries, and their relative 
isolation includes the isolation of skills and competencies. They also evince 
separate symbols, not the least striking of which are uniforms, a distinctive 
ideological orthodoxy, or at least mindset, and, in many cases, remnants 
within the ranks of a distinctive military-associated customs, often a hold­
over from colonial times, such as the preference for a "martial race. "28 Tech­
nical expertise, the relative institutional stabil ity of most military organiza­
tions, their likely history of foreign military training, and frequent contribu­
tions to civic action projects may tend to "justify" their feelings of superior­
ity and separateness vis-a-vis civil society. 
Separate military symbols can also be very powerful. Equipment, and 
continual use of even very basic equipment, such as military boots, if un­
available to average citizens, may temporarily "brand" soldiers, even soldiers 
in mufti. 29 Moreover, an ideological orthodoxy, which does not preclude the 
existence of strident-even bitter-ideological factions within the officer 
corps, stems largely from such factors as the army's relatively weak institu­
tional raison d 'etre in the first place, the typically weak position of the newly 
democratizing nation within the global economic system, and an often em­
barrassing institutional dependence upon foreign military assistance. 30 
Military organizational patterns may also contribute to the quasi-ethnic 
character of military institutions, particularly in their emphasis upon primary 
groups. In Janowitz's interpretation, these have received, and should have 
received, the most attention as keys to organizational effectiveness. 31 Mili­
tary establishments in new democracies must have, through actual history or 
myth, a special bond of danger and heroism that brings them together. 32 
Moreover, the common background and environment of soldiers should only 
reinforce this. 33 While the instrumentality of such bonds may be transparent, 
their cultural or proto-cultural effects may be the same. Thus, under embat­
tled circumstances, military establishments do achieve at least some of the 
characteristics of ethnic movements, creating an intensified separateness 
from their larger national political system and society. When coupled with 
their monopoly over the means of coercion, such circumstances would seem 
to lend themselves readily to military intervention, an ultimate form of mili­
tary autonomy, at least in the short term. 
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What do we really know about identity formation and ethnic competition, 
however, and how might this relate to a greater understanding of civil-mili­
tary relations if, indeed, military organizations in new and newly revitalized 
democracies can increasingly be seen as quasi-ethnic entities? 
Quasi-Ethnicity and Civil-Military Relations in New Nations 
The "New World Order" has emphasized a global departure from ideological 
identities and a retwn to many of the concerns and conditions of the nine­
teenth and early twentieth centuries. Ideological struggles have thus given 
way to the establishment and assertion of ethnic and religious identities, 
renewing cultural and ethnic attachments. In discussing contemporary Eu­
rope, Bishai argues, moreover, that identity and security have become inex­
tricably linked, adding that "it is essential to recognize the mutual impact that 
security and identity have on the nature of both states and societies."34 Mili­
tary establishments necessarily play a key role in both of these areas. In this 
rapid and transparent creation of tribal identities, use is made of "building 
materials from history, from geography, from biology, from productive and 
reproductive institutions, from collective memory and from personal fanta­
sies, from power apparatuses and religious revelations." Nevertheless, "indi­
viduals, social groups, and societies process all these materials, and rearrange 
their meaning, according to social determinations and cultural projects that 
are rooted in their social structure, and in their space/time framework. "  35 
The mixture of security and identity concerns, moreover, represents a 
potentially troubling formula. As Bishai observes, "When group identity and 
security [are] created by the state, the result is a system which privileges the 
identities which exert the most political power."  36 The electoral machinery of 
new democracies, in.J>ther words, must expect almost immediately to begin 
receiving challenges from military establishments. The struggle over mis­
sions and budgets typically initiates this political contestation. 
The quasi-ethnic identity of a military establishment might well feed 
upon class interests. Military officers (and even recruits) in new democracies 
have come in the past from middle and lower-middle class backgrounds, 
from rural areas, and from geographically remote regions. 37 There are nu­
merous social and economic reasons for this. One result relates directly to the 
use of the military as a political force: it establishes a separateness that is 
openly conducive to social control. An alternative explanation is that the 
adoption of a quasi-ethnic identity within an army should directly address a 
significant institutional vulnerability :  the development of ethnic divisions 
among military ranks. If an organization comes to be dominated by such 
schisms, its ability to function effectively and within unified policy objec­
tives would seem to be compromised. The struggle for power and resources 
in newly democratizing multi-ethnic countries, and those engaged in demo-
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cratic renewal, is usually intense. The trump cards in most instances of eth­
no-politics are unity and commitment. Military establishments manifest these 
traits in spades. 
Cases 
West Africa represents a study in contrasts. West African countries have a 
multitude of ethnic groups, and mil itary establishments have typically fought 
bloody civil wars with ethnic bases. This was the case in Nigeria, where the 
secession of Biafra led to a bloody, multi-year conflict and the deaths of 
millions of people. The Nigerian military today struggles to defend the coun­
try against Boko Haram, a northern Islamist extremist group, in part because 
of a preponderance of ethnic northerners in its officer corps and enlisted 
ranks. It has obviously been unable to develop a separate military identity, 
although Ibikunle Adeakin argues in his chapter that it seems to be approach­
ing the point of developing one. Guinea, as Mamadou Diouma Bab's chapter 
explains, while dominated by traditional ethnic groups and a tradition of 
inter-ethnic violence, has apparently successfully established a separate mili­
tary identity. Unlike virtually all of its West African neighbors, it has not had 
a civil war, has maintained a high level of military effectiveness, and al­
though not noted for its respect for human rights, has had, relatively speak­
ing, a degree of civil peace, mostly under a unified military dictatorship. 
East Africa presents the most varied and interesting cases of post-inde­
pendence military adaptation regarding quasi-ethnicity and the challenges of 
civil-military relations. Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania experienced simultane­
ously the East African military mutiny of 1 964, mostly over pay disputes and 
rumors that British officers would be retained indefinitely in what was then a 
single (albeit, lightly partitioned) unit, the East African Rifles. Although the 
mutiny was quickly settled in three different ways, over the next thirty years 
each of the three new military establishments responded very differently, as 
chapters in this volume illustrate. In Tanzania, where the mutiny was argu­
ably the worst, and students and workers threatened to join in a revolt to 
overthrow the young Tanganyikan government, the Tanganyikan Rifles were 
completely disestablished once British troops were brought in to quell the 
revolt. The colonial military was replaced with a wholly new institution, the 
Tanzanian People 's Defence Force (TPDF), comprised entirely of highly 
ideological and nationalistic officers and enlisted men, all of whom were 
recruited exclusively from the Tanganyika African National Union, the revo­
lutionary party founded by the nation's first leader, Julius Nyerere, who had 
been deeply embarrassed by the mutiny. Kiswahili was established as the 
sole institutional language of the TPDF, national and technological develop­
ment through education became its primary institutional focus, and the ex­
port of these values to the nation became its long-term strategy. Thus, al-
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though the TPDF had adopted by invention a quasi-ethnic identity, it was not 
adopted for purposes of creating institutional autonomy for the military. 
Rather, as the chapter explains, the mil itary was conceived as a vanguard 
agency focused on creating a culture and identity that could, and ultimately 
was, spread to and adopted by all Tanzanians. The TPDF apparently used its 
quasi-ethnic identity as a vanguard force for change. 
Uganda's response to the 1 964 mutiny was to concede completely to the 
pay demands of the mutineers, to retain the preexisting military structures, 
soldiers and officers, and in effect to set the stage for the 1 97 1  military coup 
of General Idi Amin and his Nubian ethnic group. Britain, the colonial pow­
er, had staffed the enlisted ranks of the Ugandan Rifles with these Nilotes, or 
Nubians, a group of Nilotic and Sudanic peoples originally from the north, 
regarded in their relatively new tribal affinities as a "martial race," who had 
come from tribes in Sudan and Somalia and had reinvented their identities 
around a religion (Islam), distinctive dress and loose and relatively recent 
"tribal" customs. Most Ugandans were of sub-Saharan African, or Bantu, 
origins. The Nubians, Nilotic peoples, had been dominated after WWI in 
Uganda by the much larger and more powerful Bantu-origin Baganda and 
Banyankole ethnic groups, had been directed within the colonial military by 
Bantu non-commissioned officers, and only very gradually attained com­
mand positions. In 1 97 1 ,  when a key line commander, Chief of Staff Major 
General Idi Amin, overthrew the government of President Milton Obote, one 
of his first moves was to reinforce Kiswahili as the official language of the 
army, while especially rewarding speakers of Kinubi, and to begin a wide­
spread purge on non-Nilotic officers and enlisted men. This rapid move to 
establish a distinctive military identity, however, was one of narrowing tradi­
tional enrollments until only those traditional groups absolutely loyal to him 
remained. While it was a move to achieve complete military autonomy and 
political domination of Uganda, it bore little relation to the invention of a 
new quasi-ethnic identity. When Yoweri Museveni finally came to power in 
1 986, stabilizing the system, he openly favored senior bureaucrats and mili­
tary officers from his tribe, the Banyankole, hence perpetuating this pattern 
of traditional ethnic domination through the military. He has played a careful 
balancing game ever since while fighting a succession of ethnically based 
civil wars, mostly against dispossessed northerners. 
Kenya's independence in December 1 964 was concurrent with the East 
African mutiny, and thus left its first political leaders largely unscathed by 
the event. Jomo Kenyatta, the first post-independence leader of Kenya, and a 
Kikuyu, initiated and followed a careful manipulation of the ethnic balance 
of the Kenyan military that elevated Kikuyu officers to the top ranks. Subse­
quent leaders have followed suit, appointing their ethnic group to key mili­
tary positions. Nevertheless, the military has been excluded from internal 
security duties. The result has been a largely professional military establish-
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ment, albeit one that has been commanded by senior officers from the presi­
dent's ethnic group, that has not intervened in politics. Rather, ethno-politics, 
with a good deal of inter-ethnic violence, has dominated the presidential 
political agenda, and continues to do so today, although without military 
participation. 
Algeria is prototypical of several North African countries. Its revolution 
in the early I 960s created a military establishment that was unified, nominal­
ly ideological and secular. Nevertheless, as Yassine Belkamel argues, it was 
gradually co-opted by corrupt, foreign-trained officers who turned on the 
democratic processes in the late I 980s and early 1 990s, at the cost of hun­
dreds of thousands of deaths. The unique identity and autonomy of the Alger­
ian military, in this case, served the military well, but dealt harsh and repeat­
ed blows to the multi-ethnic society in Algeria. The Berbers, in particular, a 
majority, were largely excluded from the political life of the country. 
Paulo Gustavo Pellegrino Correa explores the dynamics of the military in 
tiny Suriname, the only non-African case in our study, and the most recent 
new nation. The retention of some elements of Dutch military culture, the 
resistance to dominant ethnic politics by the military in the new nation, and 
the desire to create a safe platform for nefarious and apparently criminal 
activities led to a bloody military coup and the charismatic and personalistic 
military dictatorship of Desi Bouterse, 1 980-1 987. Implicated in the murder 
of fifteen young critics of his dictatorship, and convicted in absentia by a 
Dutch court in I 999 of drug trafficking, Bouterse was elected president in 
201 0. The role of the military, set apart from the myriad of ethnic commu­
nities in Suriname in its unique cultural adaptation, is of central interest in 
this regard. 
CONCLUSION 
The increasingly "tribal" behavior of many military establishments is almost 
undeniable. The suggestion, however, that military establishments under cer­
tain circumstances may evince quasi-ethnic identities has preeminently polit­
ical implications, and is thus inevitably provocative. As Abner Cohen has 
noted, "Contemporary ethnicity is the result of intensive interaction between 
ethnic groupings and not the result of complete separatism." 38 That interac­
tion is inevitably political. While military identity-formation appears to be 
strengthened to some extent in an environment of relative isolation, its exer­
cise is best appreciated in conditions of social conflict. Such interactions, 
often conflicts, among other ethnic entities have frequently involved xeno­
phobia, hatred and, ultimately, violence. At the very least, this is a worrying 
feature of contemporary civil-military relations. 
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From a primordialist perspective, the military qua ethnic group suggests 
an intractable budgetary foe in the legislative process, an even more strident 
opponent of particular foreign and domestic policies, and even a self-right­
eous intervening force in the nation's political processes. From an instrumen­
talist perspective, a military establishment qua quasi-ethnicity may represent 
a trump card in the increasingly difficult game of ethno-politics. Neither of 
these alternatives is particularly attractive to the modern democratizing state. 
Each raises a key question: What do we know about ethno-politics? Roths­
child has argued that "politicized ethnicity often erodes the legitimacy of a 
state and the effectiveness of the state 's apparatus, and while it sometimes 
triggers and even spearheads anti-regime and anti-governmental violence, it 
ordinarily does not supply the follow-through conceptual model for major, 
historic, systemic social revolutions." 39 It tends, in other words, to be reac­
tionary. Moreover, it also tends to be intensely changeable, 40 and hence 
unpredictable. Finally, it tends to be violent and, apparently, increasingly so. 
Anthony D.  Smith noted in the 1 980s, in a pattern that appears to be pro­
gressing today, that "interethnic conflict has become more intense and en­
demic in the twentieth century than at any time in history."41  
Nationalism, the silent figure lurking behind this analysis, is perhaps its 
most important point. The era of the national security states in Latin America 
(and, to a lesser extent, in Asia) is apparently finished, although indications 
are that the military establishments in newly democratizing countries are 
experiencing a new wave of nationalistic fervor. Anti-globalism and eco­
nomic collapse are increasingly feeding upon more intense "democratic" 
politics in many countries. The "Arab Spring" is but one such phenomenon. 
If, indeed, military establishments occasionally adopt quasi-ethnic identities, 
they also more frequently appear to assume the role of hyper-nationalists. 
This is threatening tt, democracy. More importantly, perhaps, while such 
behavior may resolve a local institutional dilemma, it ultimately threatens 
world peace. 
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